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This technical report includes two separate but related
studies. Both studies provide empirical evidence of a
relationship between financial measures for defense contractor
firms and pricing strategies adopted by those firms. Both
studies attempt to distinguish between "skimming" and
"penetration" pricing approaches. Both studies use the same
sample of firms within the defense aerospace industry.
The first study, "The Effect of Financial Condition on
Product Pricing Strategy," tests for associations of measures of
profitability, liquidity, capital structure, asset utilization
and investment with pricing strategies. Results indicate that a
small set of financial ratios can explain a substantial
proportion of the difference in pricing strategies adopted across
the sample of contractors.
The second study, "Organizational Slack and Risk Taking
Behavior: Tests of Product Pricing Strategy," attempts to combine
financial measures into a framework for reflecting the broader
concept of organizational slack. Slack is hypothesized to
motivate a more risky pricing strategy. Tests confirm the
hypothesis
.
Separate abstracts summarizing the two individual studies in
more detail are presented immediately preceding each study.
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THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL CONDITION ON
PRODUCT PRICING STRATEGY
Abstract
This study investigates the information content of financial
ratios in the context of detecting pricing strategy for new
products. The premise is that product pricing strategy is
selected to serve corporate financial goals and may be
predictable using financial measures publicly available prior to
product introduction. Two pricing strategies are identified:
skimming and penetration. The hypotheses are that firms with
high profitability will skim to maintain high profit measures,
that firms with high risk will skim to increase liquidity and
minimize long run uncertainty, and that firms with low asset
utilization will penetrate to increase activity. Using data from
35 new projects, the slopes of price reduction curves over time
are calculated to reflect pricing strategy. Correlation and
multiple regression tests are conducted to test the associations
between price reduction slopes and financial ratios taken from
the year prior to project initiation. Regression models
including sets of financial 'ratios are able to explain over 50%
of the variance in price reduction slopes. Findings suggest that
pricing strategy is associated with risk and asset utilization,
as reflected in financial ratios.

THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL CONDITION ON
PRODUCT PRICING STRATEGY
Background-Pricing Strategy
There are numerous ways to describe or categorize pricing
strategies in general (see Small Business Report [1985]) but
firms introducing new products or technology typically use one of
two common product pricing approaches: penetration or skimming
(Dean [19691 » Wind [1982]). Discussed by many authors, the two
strategies are widely understood and used by business
practitioners. The skimming strategy calls for high initial
prices followed by lower prices at later stages, while the
penetration strategy calls for a low initial price with little or
no price reduction over time.
The objective of the skimming strategy is to achieve the
maximum profit in the shortest time by charging the highest price
that the market will bear (James [1969]). Price reductions occur
in a series of steps which are timed to provide as much profit as
possible at each step. Thus the advantage of skimming is a more
rapid return on investment. Firms adopting a skimming" strategy
must keep one step ahead of competitors; there is the risk that
competitors may under-price and enter the market.
The objective of the penetration strategy is to develop wide
product demand rapidly through a low initial price. Once the
market has been captured, the firm can take advantage of either
price increases or cost reductions to earn additional profits
1
(Dean [19693, James [19693). The firm's established market
position dampens the incentives of competitors to enter the
market
.
There are clear incentives for a firm to conceal its pricing
strategy. If customers assume a firm is skimming, they may delay
purchases to obtain a more favorable price later on. If
competitors detect a skimming strategy, they may counter with a
lower price and capture market share. If competitors detect a
penetration strategy they will anticipate the lack of price
reduction in the future and be more encouraged to enter the
market. For these same reasons there are benefits to be gained
by customers and competitors if pricing strategy can be
predicted.
The premise of this paper is that pricing strategy will be
influenced by financial condition, and that pricing strategy may
be predictable using financial ratios publicly available prior to
product introduction. The next section of the paper links
financial condition to pricing strategy and lists the hypotheses
to be tested. Later sections describe the sample, measurement of
variables and statistical procedures used to test the hypotheses.
Financial Condition and Pricing Strategy
Firms typically have the greatest freedom in choosing
between the skimming and penetration strategies at the time of
initial introduction of a new product (Wasson [1974]). Each of
the two strategies can be described in terms of the relationship
between two variables: the price of the first unit sold and the
rate of price reduction overtime. Skimmers exhibit a high first
unit price and a steep price reduction curve, while penetrators
exhibit a low first unit price and a flat price reduction curve.
In principle the firm could be indifferent to the two strategies.
A high initial price coupled with steep price reduction or a low
initial price coupled with flatter price reduction could both
result in the same present value for a product and the same net
economic benefit. Neither strategy is inherently more
profitable. In practice, however, there are likely both general
external and firm-specific internal factors that will result in
one strategy being preferred to the other.
External factors are related to the nature of the product's
market and include such things as the degree of competition,
price elasticity, market segmentation, the length of the
product's life cycle, and customer familiarity with the product.
While clearly important, these external factors are not of
immediate concern here. (See Dean [19691, James [1969],
Caferelli [1980], Wasson C 1 974] for further elaboration.)
Internal factors may be related to financial condition and
reflected in the firm's financial ratios. Readers familiar with
accounting or financial statement analysis are well aware that
numerous ratios can be calculated from financial statement data
and that these ratios can be categorized in various ways. It is
not unreasonable however to categorize financial ratios into five
broad categories representing five aspects of financial
condition:
1. Profitability (Return on Investment)
2. Short Term Liquidity
3. Solvency (Capital Structure)
4. Asset utilization (Activity or Turnover)
5. Capital investment
The object here is to suggest why pricing strategy may depend on
these aspects of financial condition.
Profitability: As indicated above, neither skimming nor
penetration is in the long run inherently more profitable; the
central difference between the two is in the timing of profits.
Skimming provides for high profit recognition immediately after
product introduction, while penetration holds out the possibility
of cost reductions or price increases and higher profits at a
later stage. Since executives are frequently compensated on the
basis of profit measures, one might expect sensitivity to the
effect of pricing strategy on such measures to influence the
choice of strategy. High profitability ratios ex ante (prior to
the introduction of a new product) may be associated with
continuing demand for high profit projects in the short run.
Penetration, when compared to skimming, increases the probability
that average return on investment measures will decline ex post
and, ceteris paribus, does so more for firms with high
profitability ex ante. Consequently, firms with high
profitability are hypothesized to have a stronger preference for
skimming.
4 .
Short term Liquidity: Initiation of new products may
require substantial outlays to finance inventories, production
volume and product introduction costs. Dean C 1 969 3 and James
[1969] argue that skimming, because of the faster payback due to
higher initial prices, is appropriate for firms with a need for
funds in the short run. Ceteris paribus, firms with a poor short
term liquidity position should have greater difficulty or a
higher cost of raising funds externally and may prefer to
generate funds rapidly through the product. Consequently, firms
with poor liquidity are hypothesized to have a stronger
preference for skimming.
Solvency: Solvency measures reflect the amount and type of
debt in the firm's capital structure and indicate long term risk.
Analogous to the reasoning presented above under liquidity, firms
that are more highly leveraged should have a higher cost of
raising new capital and may exhibit a preference for raising
funds through the new project by skimming. In addition, the
alternative pricing strategies differ with respect to long run
risk. The penetration strategy requires that competition be
discouraged and returns be earned over the long run to be
successful. However skimming, by front-ending profit, reduces
the risk associated with future uncertainty in the product's
market (Dean [19693). Firms with greater risk may prefer to
reduce future uncertainty. For both these reasons, firms with
poorer solvency measures (more highly leveraged) are hypothesized
to prefer skimming.
Asset utilization: If a firm has limited manufacturing
capacity, a small volume but highly profitable market approach
(i.e., skimming) may be the most economic (James [19693).
Penetration requires wide diffusion of the product to be
successful and consequently requires greater availability of
capacity. Measures of activity or turnover reflect the level of
sales generated on assets and consequently indicate the degree to
which facilities, resources or capacity are being utilized. One
would expect that firms that are fully using existing capacity
may be constrained from following the higher volume penetration
strategy, while firms not fully using existing capacity should
prefer penetration to increase the probability that their
capacity is put in service. Consequently, firms with low
activity ratios are hypothesized to prefer penetration.
Capital investment: Somewhat analogously, investment in new
assets may indicate future pricing strategy. Skimmers should
have less requirement to expand capacity, while penetrators,
expecting to generate volume through low initial price, have a
greater need to expand. Major investment in capacity could
signal a penetration strategy, and given an increase in new
assets, penetration would be a preferable strategy to assure
utilization of those assets. Consequently, firms with high
ratios of new investment in plant and equipment, relative to
existing assets or levels of activity, are hypothesized to prefer
penetration
.
To summarize the hypotheses: Firms that skim (as compared
to firms that penetrate) are expected to exhibit measures of high
profitability, poor liquidity, poor solvency, high asset
utilization and low capital investment, prior to new product
introduction
.
Slope of the Price Reduction Curve
As indicated before, the two strategies can be described in
terms of the relationship between first unit price and the
subsequent price reduction curve. Learning curves can be used to
distinguish the two strategies. Learning curve theory (Womer
[19793, Kaplan [1982]) describes the decline in per unit
production costs a manufacturer incurs with increasing volume.
The learning curve concept originated from the observation that
individuals performing repetitive tasks tend to exhibit a rate of
improvement, but there are many reasons for reduction of costs
over repetitive operations: more efficient labor, less material
from reduced scrap and waste, and higher productivity from
improved processes. Thus a learning curve can more generally be
referred to as a cost reduction curve. A per unit reduction can
be extended conceptually to the measure of price per unit. Thus
learning curves can also be used to represent price reduction
curves
.
The learning curve function relates a dependent variable
(price) with an independent variable (volume) as follows:
P = AX B
or in log form:
In P = In A + B (lnX)
7 .
Where P is the price of the Xth unit produced and A is the price
of the first unit. If prices are level as volume (X) increases,
then the exponent B is zero. B is negative when prices decline




A slope of 1.00 implies a horizontal line - i.e., no price
reduction. The lower the decimal value of the slope, the higher
the price reduction rate. For example, .800 is a steeper
(faster) price reduction rate than .900.
The slopes of learning curves fit to actual prices are used
in this study to reflect pricing strategy. Relatively high
values for S are consistent with penetration (flat slope), while
lower values are consistent with skimming (steeper reduction).
Sample and Pata
The products whose price reduction curves are examined in
this study consist of major military weapons systems (aircraft
and missiles) acquired by the Department of Defense from 1951-
1980. Two publications, U.S. Military Aircraft Cost Handbook
(Depuy, et al. [1983]) and U.S. Military Misstl* Cost Handbook
(Crawford, et al. [1984]), provide a wealth of data on per unit
costs, volume and cost patterns for most major U.S. aircraft or
missile systems. (Note: costs for the government are prices to
the supplier.) Price reduction slopes using learning curves
8 .
(using constant dollars) are also included. The handbooks
provide data for numerous weapon system programs but programs had
to pass three filters to be included in the study. First,
programs had to run at least three years in order for meaningful
slopes to be calculated. Second, programs where learning curves
fit to the raw price data provided a poor "fit" were eliminated.
Since the purpose here is to explain variations in price-
reduction curves, only programs with well-defined price reduction
slopes were included. Operationally, an R 2 value in excess of .6
was used as a cutoff for inclusion. Third, financial statement
data for the year prior to program initiation had to be available
without unreasonable search.
The resulting sample consisted of 35 programs. Project
identifiers, the producer, the year of project initiation and
price reduction slopes for the 35 programs are provided in table
1. Slopes around .800 to .900 are common for complex, high-
technology products, although more extreme values are not rare
(Greer [1985]), so the sample firms seem to be representative of
the product type.
Clearly defense systems are of a specialized nature and not
typical of products in general. The market is unusual, with a
monopsonistic buyer and an oligopolistic seller. Yet varying
incentives exist for both skimming and penetration within this
market. Sellers that skim risk program termination or
curtailment due to excessive price, and risk competitor entry by
encouraging the government to seek lower prices elsewhere (second
sourcing). Sellers that penetrate risk program termination
before long run profits can be realized.
There are some benefits from focusing on defense systems.
Since the customer is a constant across the sample products , some
element of control over external factors relating to customer and
market is achieved. Similarly, since all firms in the sample are
in the same defense aerospace industry, control over industry
differences in financial ratios is achieved.
Financial Ratios and Correlation Analysis
In general, the object of the analysis was to determine if
financial ratios could explain variation in price-reduction
slopes in a manner consist with the previously hypothesized
relationships
.
Twenty-four financial ratios, several within each of the
five identified categories, were computed for eaoh program for
the year prior to program start. Each ratio and its formula are
provided in table 2. In general the ratios used are closely
related to ones commonly found in Accounting and Financial
Statement Analysis text books, but a few require comment. Ratio
12, the Equity to Debt ratio was used rather than the more
traditional Debt to Equity ratio because some sample firms had
negative equity. For the Investment ratios (21-24), new
investment in plant and equipment (P&E) was calculated as P&E
fc
+
Depreciation t -P&E t-1 . This provides only an approximation of new
investment but was necessary because detailed Statement of
10
Changes in Financial Position data was unavailable for many
firms
,
particularly those from earlier years. Each of the four
investment ratios is an attempt to deflate investment for some
aspect of firm size.
Each of the individual ratios was correlated with price
reduction slopes. Expected signs, Pearson correlation
coefficients and significance levels are reported in the right
hand columns of table 2. (Spearman non-parametric correlations
provided substantially the same results). Two findings are of
note: First, virtually all of the univariate correlations are
insignificant. The null hypothesis of no association can be
rejected for only three ratios (return on equity, current debt
ratio, investment to funds) at even a liberal .11 alpha level.
Second, in spite of general insignificance, the signs of the
associations are as hypothesized for all but six of the ratios.
All ratios within the activity and investment categories have the
expected sign. All five ratios with wrong signs have
correlations less than .2, while all ratios with correlations in
excess of .2 (eight) have the correct sign. Some of the wrong
signs are perhaps understandable. For example, a negative
correlation was hypothesized for profitability ratios and a
positive correlation for interest coverage ratios. Yet negative
signs are observed for both. One would expect, ceteris paribus,
that firms with high profitability are also more likely to have
high interest coverage. Consequently, in these univariate tests,
the profitability aspect may dominate causing the negative signs
11
for interest coverage.
This effect suggest that univariate tests may be
inappropriate and that controlling for the inherent
interrelationships between individual ratios with a multivariate
design may be helpful.
Regression Models
Stepwise multiple regression was used to create models
including several ratios jointly explaining the variance in
slopes. By selectively influencing the entry of variables into
the model during the stepwise procedure, the researcher has
considerable control over the model that results. Various models
were investigated in a heuristic and iterative fashion. Three
qualitative factors were of concern in constructing the models:
1. Parsimony: A model with few ratios was preferred
2. Mul t icollinear ity : Low pairwise correlations
between ratios and low collinearity across the set
of ratios in a given model was desired.
3. Meaningful signs and lack of redundancy: Some of
the ratios in the study are just different measures
of the same construct. For example return on total
assets and return on equity are both profitability
measures. Both were selected in some models, with
opposite signs. This suggests that what is
explaining the variance in slope is not the
profitability measures but difference in their
12
construction (i.e., different denominators) and
some other factor (e.g. leverage) is what's
important. Attempts were made to eliminate obvious
redundancies and interactions of this nature.
Three statistical criteria were used to evaluate models.
1. F value and its significance;
2. Significance of t statistics for individual
coefficients;
3. Adjusted R 2 (unadjusted R 2 necessarily increases as
more ratios are added to a model.)
Table 3 lists the best three, four, five and six ratio models
developed in line with the above qualitative factors and
statistical criteria. Looking at the table, several items are of
note: Regardless of the number of ratios included in the models,
the same relatively small subset of ratios are important. All
the models have significant F values at .004 or lower.
Individual coefficients tend to be significant at traditional
levels for the three and four ratio models (A, B, and C) but
deteriorate somewhat as additional ratios are included (D, E, and
F). Looking at adjusted R 2 values, there is a material increase
in variance explained when a fourth ratio is included, but only
marginal increases with the inclusion of additional ratios.
(Adjusted R 2 falls when more than six ratios are included.)
While models B and C are perhaps "best" in terms of the
criteria previously outlined (parsimony, high R, significant F
and t values) , model F has the highest R 2 and includes all of the
13
ratios that tended to be important predictors. Consequently it
is best to focus on model F for discussion purposes. All six of
the ratios in model F appear with the hypothesized sign. A
factor analysis was conducted on the full set of ratios and,
except for some overlap between the current ratio and the current
debt ratio, each of the ratios in the model is associated with a
distinct individual factor. Consequently, it is fair to infer
that several different aspects of financial condition are
captured by the model. Four of the five ratio categories
identified earlier (table 2) are represented in the model. Only
the profitability category is missing.
The ratios included in the model seem to emphasize "current"
rather than long-run aspects of financial condition: Two
liquidity ratios were important (Current Ratio and Receivables
Turnover), while one solvency measure (Current Debt Ratio)
involves current liabilities, and the activity measure (Inventory
Turnover) relates sales to a current asset. However, models
replacing the Current Debt Ratio with the Debt Ratio (ratio # 11)
and the Inventory Turnover ratio with the Asset Turnover ratio (#
17) were still significant and had adjusted R2 values above .40.
Discussion and Conclusions
The models presented in this paper demonstrate that pricing
strategy is significantly associated with financial condition and
suggest that financial ratios available prior to product
introduction may be useful in predicting pricing strategy. A
relatively small set of ratios explained over half of the
14 -
variance in price-reduction rate. The most important ratios were
ones reflecting aspects of risk (liquidity and solvency) and
capital utilization (activity and investment). For these aspects
of financial condition, the hypotheses were supported. Firms
with higher risk immediately prior to product introduction tended
to prefer the skimming strategy. Firms that had engaged in major
investment in new assets or were poorly utilizing existing assets
prior to product introduction tended to prefer penetration.
Profitability ratios were not found to be significantly
related to pricing strategy after controlling for ratios from
other categories. Given the nature of the sample, government
contractors, this is perhaps not surprising. Interviews with
major defense contractors (Defense Financial and Investment
Review [19853) reveal that contrators tend to have the following
goals:
- To reduce short term risk from cyclic market activity
through investment in diversified activities
- To properly employ financial and equity leverage
- To achieve operating effectiveness and efficiency
- To effectively manage production, resources and
capital to achieve an adequate return on investment.
Defense contractors have been characterized as risk adverse,
profit satisfiers rather than profit maximizers (Kennedy,
[1983,1985]). The presence of risk and capital utilization
ratios in the model, and the absence of profitability ratios, are
consistent with the goals and character of defense contractors.
15
Perhaps studies involving firms from a different industry would
reveal profitability as an important variable.
There are some obvious limitations to the study. Sample
size is small. The industry and product market investigated are
not typical of industries and markets in general. Although
numerous ratios were included, they do not exhaust the possible
measures that can be calculated from publicly available financial
information. Measures of changes in ratios from period to period
prior to product introduction may be of interest. Lastly, the
models presented in the paper are at this stage only descriptive.
Their predictive ability to firms outside of the sample on which
they were developed has not been established. In spite of the
limitations* the findings do indicate that financial condition
influences pricing strategy. Each of the limitations offers an
opportunity for future research.
16
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Project Company Year Slope
F-86D North American 51 .926
F-89D Northrup 51 .885
F-86F North American 51 .870
F-84F Republic 51 .725
F-100A/C North American 52 .839
F-1B/C/MF-1C North American 52 .783
F-102-A General Dynamics 53 .724
F 101-A/B/C McDonnell Douglas 54 .802
F-100D North American 54 .934
A-4B McDonnell Douglas 55 .834
B-52G Boeing 57 .869
F-106A/B General Dynamics 57 .837
A-4C McDonnell Douglas 57 .894
F-105B/D Republic 57 .759
F-4A/B McDonnell Douglas 59 .834
P-3A Lockheed 60 .718
A-6A Gruman . 61 .829
RIM-24B General Dynamics 61 .923
A-4E McDonnell Douglas 61 .892
RIM-2E General Dynamics 61 .930
F-4D McDonnell Douglas 64 .886
A-7A/B Vought 65 .852
P-3B Lockheed 65 .910
RIM-66A General Dynamics 66 .763
RIM-67A General Dynamics 66 .825
AIM-7F — Raytheon 68 .773
A-7D Vought 68 .950
S-3A Lockheed 72 .846
F-15A McDonnell Douglas 73 .917
AGM-78D General Dynamics 73 1.088
AH-1S Bell 75 .891
AH-1T Bell 76 1.021
F/A-18A McDonnell Douglas 79 .860
AIM-7M Raytheon 80 .880
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ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK AND RISK TAKING BEHAVIOR:
TESTS OF PRODUCT PRICING STRATEGY
Abstract
This paper tests the relationship between organizational slack and risk
making in organizational decision making. Product pricing strategies are
Identified and characterized with respect to risk. Organizational slack is
measured using various financial variables. Results indicate that firms which
lave increases in organizational slack prior to the introduction of new product
ire more likely to adopt a higher risk product pricing strategy. Implications
-egarding the measurement of slack using financial variables are also discussed.

ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK AND RISK TAKING BEHAVIOR:
TESTS OF PRODUCT PRICING STRATEGY
Traditional theories in economics and finance argue that individuals and
organizations are risk adverse and that higher risk projects or strategies will
be undertaken only if there is a commensurate higher expected return. While such
theories based on risk aversion don't imply that there is a causal relationship
between firm performance and risk taking behavior, they do suggest that over the
long run a positive association between risk and return should be exhibited.
However, studies of the within-industry relationship between risk and return for
several industries indicate that the observed relationship is most often negative
(Bowman, 1980; Treacy,1980) . Bowman (1982) termed this result the "risk-return
paradox" and hypothesized that it was caused by poorer performing firms adopting
higher risk decisions.
An inverse relationship between performance and risk taking has been
addressed by various authors (Cyert & March, 1963; March 1981; March and Shapira,
1982) and can perhaps be explained in terms of a satisficing level of firm
performance (March & Simon, 1958; Simon 1976). Simply put, firms performing
above their satisficing level may prefer a low risk (low variance) decision
because it reduces the probability that subsequent performance will fall below
the satisficing level, while firms performing below their satisficing level may
prefer a high risk (high variance) decision because it increases the probability
that subsequent performance will fall above the satisficing level.
Singh (1983) cited evidence both supporting and rejecting the hypothesis
that poor performance motivates increased risk taking and argued that the
contradictory empirical findings occur because performance and risk taking are
linked in a complex manner. He posited two conceptually distinct processes that
link performance and risk taking. In his model, good performance has a negative
3
direct impact on risk taking because of the role of the satisficing level,
mentioned above. On the other hand, there is also an indirect impact mediated by
organizational slack. First, good performance increases organizational slack
(Cyert & March, 1963); then increased slack provides the opportunity for
increased risk taking. The positive relationship between slack and risk taking
rests on the idea that the presence of slack reduces the criteria by which
actions are considered acceptable (Cyert & March, 1963), allows the organization
to experiment and innovate (Hambrick & Snow, 1977) and permits the firm to act
more boldly (Bourgeois, 1981).
Testing his model on a sample of 54 firms, Singh found tentative support for
both processes; measures of performance were negatively associated with some
measures of risk, but performance was also positively associated with slack,
which was positively associated with risk.
This paper focuses on the link between organizational slack and risk taking
and presents tests of the hypothesis that increases in slack are followed by more
risky strategic decisions. While this paper addresses the same issue raised by
Singh (slack and risk taking) there are several differences between the
approaches used. Singh tested for associations between slack and global measures
of risk (developed from a questionnaire and from financial measures) . This study
instead isolates a specific strategic decision, characterizes alternatives in
terms of risk, and tests for associations between slack and the alternative
adopted. In short, the focus is on an identifiable action. Singh tested for
contemporaneous associations between slack and risk measures. This study
investigates the association between changes in slack and subsequent risk-taking
behavior. It may be more defensible to argue for a cause-effect association when
the potential effect (risk taking) is observed a point in time following the
presumed cause (slack). In addition, this study incorporates a wider set of
measures to reflect slack.
The perspective of the paper is that slack is a variable that influences the
strategic behavior of the organization. That perspective is consistent with
previous studies linking slack with other strategic behaviors such as innovation
(Hambrick & Snow, 1977; Mohr, 1969; Rosner, 1965,1968), research and development
(Kay, 1979) and political behavior (Bourgeois, 1981; Bourgeois & Singh, 1982).
The specific decision investigated in the study is pricing strategy for new
products. Alternative pricing strategies and their riskiness are discussed in
the next section. The measurement of organizational slack rests on recent
studies using publicly available financial accounting data. Slack measurement and
sample considerations are discussed in the METHODS section. The ANALYSIS section
describes empirical tests and provides evidence in support of a positive
relationship between slack and risk taking. The DISCUSSION section comments on
the meaning of the results and, in particular, discusses some implications
concerning the use financial accounting data to measure slack.
PRICING STRATEGIES
There are numerous ways to describe or categorize pricing strategies in
general (see Albaum, 1975; "The Pricing Decision", 1985) but firms introducing
new products or technology typically use one of two broad product pricing
approaches: penetration or skimming. Discussed by many authors (e.g.,
Caferelli, 1980; Dean, 1969; James, 1969; Wind, 1982) the two strategies are
widely understood and used by business practitioners. The skimming strategy
calls for high initial prices followed by lower prices at later stages, while the
penetration strategy calls for a low initial price with little or no price
reduction over time.
The objective of the skimming strategy is to achieve the maximum profit in
the shortest time by charging the highest price that the market will bear. Price
reductions occur in a series of steps which are timed to provide as much profit
as possible at each step. Thus one advantage of skimming is a more rapid return
on investment.
In contrast) the objective of the penetration strategy is to develop wide
product demand rapidly through a low initial price. Once the market has been
captured, the firm can take advantage of either price increases or cost
reductions to earn additional profits. The firm's established market position
dampens the incentives of competitors to enter the market.
Pricing Strategy and Risk
Each of the two strategies can be described in terms of the relationship
between two variables: the price of the first unit sold and the rate of price
reduction over time. Skimmers exhibit a high first unit price and a steep price
reduction curve, while penetrators exhibit a low first unit price and a flat
price reduction curve. Neither strategy is inherently more profitable and both
are observed in practice.
The two strategies do differ in the timing of profits and in riskiness. The
consensus opinion is that skimming is less risky: With a high initial price,
skimming maximizes short-term returns and provides a more rapid recovery of funds
to finance the costs of product introduction and future expansion (James, 1969)
•
By front-ending profit, skimming reduces the risk associated with uncertainty in
the product's market (Dean, 1969). Skimming allows for greater flexibility; it is
typically easier to introduce a product with a high price and then reduce the
price as knowledge of the market and product demand is gained than it is to
introduce at a low price and increase price later to cover unexpected costs or
exploit product popularity (Dean, 1969).
Penetration is a more risky strategy. It assumes there is untapped market
potential. It requires greater commitment of productive capacity. It assumes
low competition from other manufacturers. "Attempting to take a sizeable
(market) share through lower price is risky and often requires a heavy and long
commitment of financial resources. Since the stakes and risks are high, the
potential rewards must be substantial 1* (Caferelli, 1980: 176). "High rewards are
possible with this strategy but only if economies of scale occur as predicted.
Therefore, it is often a high risk strategy as well, since the potential exists
for disastrous losses if costs fail to decline as rapidly as expected.
Production problems or unrealized sales volumes can also undermine this strategy"
("The Pricing Decision", 1985: 77).
The general hypothesis of this paper is that organizational slack is
associated with risk taking. Using pricing policy as a strategic decision and
assuming penetration is the more risky pricing approach, a positive association
between slack and adoption of the penetration strategy is hypothesized.
METHODS
Slope of the Price Reduction Curve
As indicated before, the two strategies can be described in terms of the
relationship between first unit price and the subsequent price reduction curve.
Learning curves can be used to distinguish the two strategies.' The learning
curve function relates price with volume as follows:
P=AXB
Where P is the price of the Xth unit produced and A is the price of the first
unit. If prices are level as volume (X) increases, then the exponent B is zero.
The slope of the learning curve (S) is related to B as follows:
B = In S
In 2
A slope of 1.00 implies a horizontal line (i.e., no price reduction). The lower
the decimal value of the slope, the higher the price reduction rate. __
In this study, slopes of learning curves fit to actual prices were used to
reflect pricing strategy. Relatively high values for S (flat slope) are
consistent with penetration, while lower values (steeper reduction) are
consistent with skimming.
Sample
Pricing strategies for a sample of defense contractors manufacturing major
aerospace weapon systems (aircraft and missiles) for the Department of Defense
were examined in this study. Clearly defense contracting, particularly for major
weapons systems-, is specialized in nature. Both the products and market are not
typical of products and markets in general. Defense contractors were selected
for investigation for four reasons.
1. Product Type. Major weapon systems are large dollar items which may
represent a substantial segment of a manufacturer's business. Pricing strategy
for such items is likely to be an important strategic decision. Furthermore,
major weapon systems incorporate substantial innovation in design. Products
involving significant innovation provide the greatest leeway in choosing a
pricing strategy (Wasson, 1974)
.
2. Contractor Strategy and Risk. There are distinct differences in risk
between penetration and skimming strategies in the defense contracting area.^
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Defense contractors that penetrate, that have "bought-in" to a contract with
a low price, risk program termination before long run profits can be realized.
Given the uncertainties of the Federal budget process (because program funding is
approved on an annual basis) and the uncertainties of product acceptance (because
the capability of new weapons systems can not always be assessed in advance)
,
program curtailment is a real possibility. Given the uncertainties of production
costs (because of the state-of-the-art technology involved), failure to realize
higher future profits through significant cost reductions is also a risk.
Skimming is the less risky strategy. Defense contractors that skim may risk
program termination or curtailment due to excessive price, and may risk
competitor entry by encouraging the government to seek lower prices elsewhere
(termed "second sourcing"). But these risks are minimal. The high start up
costs associated with the manufacture of major weapons systems typically make
second sourcing an unattractive alternative for the government, and the
flexibility afforded by the high initial price permits the skimmer to respond to
termination threats with a price reduction.
3« Control. There are some methodological benefits gained from focusing on
the defense industry. In general, the nature of the customer, the product
market, and competitors can be expected to influence the choice of pricing
strategy. Since the buyer, the Department of Defense, is a constant across the
sample, some control over customer type and product market is achieved.
Similarly, since all sample firms are in the same defense aerospace industry,
some control over the nature of the competition and industry differences in
financial measures is also achieved.
4. Data availability. To examine pricing strategy, detailed pricing
history data must be available. Two publication, U.S. Military Aircraft Cost
Handbook (DePuy, et al., 1983) and U.S. Military Missile Cost Handbook (Crawford,
et al., 1984), provide a wealth of data on per unit prices (in both actual and
constant dollars) and volume for most major U.S. aircraft or missile systems.
Price reduction slopes were determined by fitting learning curves to the constant
dollar price data for individual weapons system programs.
Programs had to pass three filters to be included in the sample. First,
programs had to run at least three years in order to calculate meaningful slopes.
Second, programs where learning curves fit to the raw price data provided a poor
"fit" were eliminated. Since the objective was to use price-reduction curves to
reflect pricing strategy, only programs with well-defined price reduction slopes
were included. An R^ value in excess of .6 was used as a cutoff for program
inclusion. Third, financial statement data for two years prior to program
initiation had to be available without unreasonable search.
The surviving sample consisted of 34 programs. The project identifier, the
manufacturer, the year of program initiation and the price reduction slope for
each of the 34 programs are provided in table 1 . Slopes around .800 to .900 are
common for complex, high-technology products, although more extreme values do
occur (Greer, 1985), so the sample seem to be representative of the product type.
TMSCTT T1RIJT 1
The Measurement of Organizational Slack
The concept of slack is widely used in the organizational theory and
business strategy literatures, but there is no single consensus definition.-*
However, most definitions suggest the idea of "excess", "spare", "surplus",
"extra", "uncommitted", or "available" resources that provide "buffers",
"cushions" or "opportunities". Slack thus involves excess resources rather than
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just total resources. Because excess resources are difficult to identify,
operationalizing measures of slack for empirical purposes has proved problematic
and approaches have varied widely. Individual accounting-based measures, such as
the level of expenditures (Mohr, 1969), operating expenses (Wolf 1971), return on
investment (Litschert & Bonham, 1978; Odell, 1972), profit (Dimick & Murray,
1978), and sales (Litschert & Bonham, 1978) have been most frequently employed.
Each of these individual measures uses a rather narrow aspect of a firm's
condition as a proxy for the broader excess resources concept implied by slack.
Recent research by Bourgeois and Singh has developed a composite set of
measures, based on publicly available financial accounting data, to capture
slack. Originally, Bourgeois (1981) identified two sources of slack:
Internal: Slack created by managerial actions
External: Slack made available by the environment
Singh (1983) broke down internal slack into two components:
Unabsorbed: Excess liquid resources
Absorbed: Excess costs of various organizational
activities
In a combined framework, Bourgeois and Singh (1982) offered a three category
formulation of the dimensions of slack which rests on the idea of "ease-of-
recovery":
Available slack: Resources not yet assimilated into the technical
design of the organi- zation (e.g. excess
liquidity)
.
Recoverable slack: Resources that have been absorbed into the system as
excess costs, but may be recovered (e.g. excess
overhead costs).
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Potential slack: The capacity of the organization to generate extra
resources from the environment (e.g. ability to
raise capital)
.
Bourgeois and Singh (1982) provided several accounting based measures within each
category. The specific measures used in this study follow their framework (with
minor modifications noted below) and are outlined in Table 2.
INSERT TABLE 2
Some comment on the individual measures is perhaps necessary. Bourgeois
(1981) said that the extent to which resources generated by profits are
distributed as dividends or retained is a matter of managerial policy and
provides a source of slack. He suggested that "net income minus dividends" or
the "change in retained earnings" are appropriate measures of slack from this
source. Neither dividend nor retained earnings data was available for the
sample. Two measures, PROFIT and EQUITY, are designed to approximate his
measures using data that was available.
WKCAP measures the net resources the organization has tied up in current or
operating assets, relative to the level of activity. Ceteris paribus, large
stores of current resources (e,g. cash, receivables, inventories) should be an
indication of slack. Relying on the "ease-of-recovery" idea, Bourgeios and Singh
(1982) decomposed WKCAP into three separate measures: QUICK, ACCTREC and INVENT.
All four measures, then, are conceptually related and all capture aspects of the
level of current resources relative to activity.
NCASSET extends the concept of resources relative to the activity level to
non-current assets. Non-current assets reflect capacity and, when deflated by
sales, may capture excess capacity. (Bourgeois, (1981) discussed excess capacity
as an indicator of slack, but measures related to plant, equipment and other non-
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current assets were omitted in the Bourgeois and Singh framework. Additional
measures using Plant and Equipment/Sales and Total Assets/Sales were also
employed in the analysis with results similar to NCASSET)
.
GENEXP measures the level of selling and administrative expenses relative to
activity and captures the idea that slack is absorbed in various period costs
such as salaries or overhead.
CURRDEBT, LTDEBT and TOTDEBT are all measures of capital structure and are
designed to reflect the difficulty or cost of generating additional resources
from the environment by short or long term financing. (Analogous measures scaled
by sales or total asset provided similar findings) . INTCOV is a traditional
measure of the degree to which operations provides sufficient resources to
service debt and should also reflect the ease of generating additional resources
externally.
Some comments on the variables collectively are also necessary. As absolute
measures of slack they only have meaning if some assumptions hold. If it is
assumed ( 1 ) that there is some constant "necessary" level for each of the
measures when operations are "normal", (2) that deviations from the necessary
levels indicate slack, and (3) that firms in the same industry have the same
necessary level, then cross-sectional differences in the variables (for firms in
the same industry) would imply cross-sectional differences in slack. Although
previous research has adopted these assumptions when measuring slack (Singh,
1983), they are perhaps strong assumptions in the current study because the
observations while taken from the same industry, range over a 30 year period
during which industry averages for the measures may have changed.
The measures are more meaningful when used to reflect changes in slack over
time. It is more defensible to argue that there is some necessary level of a
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given measure for the "normal" operations of a particular firm. Then changes in
the measures would reflect changes in slack for the particular firm. This is not
unreasonable since the individual measures are adjusted for the level of activity
(generally, by deflating by sales). Take for example WKCAP. Analysts usually
project working capital needs as a constant percentage of sales (Bourgeois,
1981). If working capital increases at a faster rate than sales (i.e. an
increase in WKCAP over time) then it is not unreasonable to assume that there is
an increase in liquidity in excess that necessary to support the increase in
activity (i.e. an increase in slack). Bourgeios and Singh indicated that their
measures are most appropriate when used to reflect changes in slack over time.
There are also theoretical reasons to focus on changes in slack. Theories
linking strategic behavior to slack tend to see behavior as a reaction to
increases or decreases in slack rather than its absence or presence ( Bourgeois,
1981; Kay, 1979; Thompson, 1969).
With these comments in mind, tests using both absolute and change measures
were conducted.
ANALYSIS
The purpose of the analysis was to test the relationship between slack and
pricing strategy. Operationally this implied testing associations between price
reduction slopes and measures of slack or change in slack. The analysis
proceeded in several stages.
Amount of Slack
Each of the slack variables was measured one year prior to the delivery of
the first unit of product. Person correlations between each variable and price
reduction slopes were computed. (Non-parametric Spearman correlation were also
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computed for all correlation tests in the study. Findings were unchanged.)
Correlation results are provided in Table 3« Recall that greater slack is
hypothesized to be associated with the higher risk penetration strategy, so
higher measures of slack should be associated with higher price reduction slopes.
Correlation coefficients are generally low and insignificant and only seven of
the twelve variables have the correct sign. However, the two significant
variables, INVENT and NCASSET, do have the predicted sign. Relative "to the
other slack measures, INVENT and NCASSET reflect resources that are tied up in
relatively less liquid form. Perhaps the amount slack capacity motivates risk
taking.
\ IHSERT TABLE 3
Slack Gainers and Slack Losers
To investigate changes in slack, the slack variables were calculated at two
years prior to product introduction and compared to the measures at one year
prior. Using each variable individually, firms were divided into "slack gainers"
and "slack losers" depending on the directional change in the measure. T-tests
for group differences in slope are contained in table 4. Results here are also
mixed. Eight of the twelve tests exhibit the predicted sign for t. Significant
results are found for slack change as measured by changes in WKCAP, QUICK,
ACCTREC and GENEXP. Their signs are as hypothesized, except for ACCTREC. Of
interest, each measure taps a different aspect of slack than the two measures
significant in the previous correlation test. Using the "ease-of-recovery" idea,





Building on the notion of slack loss or gain, parametric measures of the
change in slack from year 2 to year 1 prior to product introduction were
calculated as follows:
Slack change = In (Variable
-j /Variable 2)
These are log relative measures that provide a symmetric distribution for
proportionate changes in either direction and in addition reduce the impact of
extreme values. Values that are negative, zero and positive imply decrease, no
change and increase, respectively. (A drawback of using the log change measures
is that they are undefined when values of the argument are negative. This
reduced sample size, particularly for the EQUITY, variable. As an alternative a
simple percentage change measure was also tested. This still reduced sample
size, because measures with negative denominators have questionable meaning, but
slightly less. Percentage change measures however can result in extreme values
when denominators are small and are consequently less desirable. In any event,
findings were similar for both log change and percentage change measures.)
Each slack change measure was correlated with price reduction slope.
Results are in the "full" column of table 5. Eight of the twelve variables are-
now significant, so it appears that the degree to which slack is lost or gained
is important. The significant variables come from all three slack categories so
the full range of slack dimensions is apparently related to pricing strategy.




In Singh's investigation of risk-taking discussed earlier, performance was
positively associated with slack and slack positively associated with risk
taking, but performance alone was negatively associated with risk taking. This
suggest that additional insight might be gained by controlling for performance.
An overall measure of firm performance, Return on Stockholders Equity (ROSE), was
calculated for each firm in the year prior to product introduction. The
correlation between ROSE and price reduction slope was -.28 (p<. 06), which is
consistent with the expected negative association between performance and risk
taking. To control for ROSE, price reduction slopes were regressed on ROSE and
then the residuals were individually correlated with the slack change variables.
Results are in the "partial" column of table 5.
With this additional control, nine of the twelve slack change variables are
significant. Each of these nine, except ACCTREC, has the predicted sign and each
has a higher correlation than in the "full" correlation tests. Controlling for
the interrelationships between performance, slack and risk taking apparently
better isolates the association between slack and risk taking.
Note also that, except for LTDEBT, all twelve measures of slack were
significant either in table 5, where the change in the slack was tested or in
table 3» where the amount of slack was tested. The only two measures, INVENT and
NCASSET, significant in table 3 are the same two that are insignificant in table
5. Perhaps some aspects of slack are best captured by the amount and others by




The overall findings from the study are consistent with the central
hypothesis. Slack was associated with the adoption of the more risky penetration
pricing strategy. This supports the conclusions of Singh (1983) that
organizational slack and risk taking are related. There are two broad
implications of the result. First it emphasizes the importance of organizational
variables such as slack in risk-taking behavior. Traditional economic theories
of risk taking typically emphasize the risk versus expected return aspects of
decision alternatives and stress the trade-offs between the two. In theory,
alternatives can be assessed in terms of risk and expected return and risk averse
decision makers will accept a greater risk alternative only if there is a
compensating greater expected return. Decision makers can be perceived as having
an indifference curve which describes the tradeoffs they are willing to accept.
The indifference curve is exogenous. The results here suggest that slack is a
variable that influences how the risk/return trade-off may be made. Penetration
is a higher risk pricing strategy, but also a potentially more rewarding one.
The findings are consistent with greater slack causing a willingness to accept
greater risk in expectation of potentially greater return. In short, slack may
be an organizational variable that influences the shape of the indifference
curve.
Second, the results reinforce the notion of slack as a variable having
behavioral consequences for the firm. Risk taking is likely permitted because
slack provides the source of resources to cushion or absorb failure. Among other
effects, slack appears to encourage innovation (e.g, Rosner, 1965, 1968),
promote research and development (Kay, 1979) and promote intra-organizational
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political harmony (Bourgeois 4 Singh, 1982), as well as encourage risk taking.
Given these various behavioral effects of slack, one might question the
completeness of organizational theories that stress efficiency and consequently
assume that slack is undesirable.
Performance and Risk Taking
While not of central interest to this study, the finding that adoption of
the penetration strategy was inversely associated with organizational performance
(ROSE) is also of note. This confirms the findings of others (Bowman 1980, 1982;
Singh 1983; Treacy, 1980) that risk taking and performance may be negatively
related, and is consistent with theories that see risk taking as dependent on the
relationship between the level of actual performance and the satisficing level.
Slack Level vs Slack Change
The findings also have some implications regarding what aspect of slack
appears to affect organizational behavior. Measures of the change in slack over
time (table 5^ were considerably better predictors of risk taking that were
measures of the level of slack at a point in time (table 3). This finding is
consistent with previous views (e.g, Bourgeois, 1981) that it is the change in
slack that influences strategic behavior rather than the amount of slack. (It
should be noted here again that the variables used to measure the amount of slack
are only valid if certain assumptions hold. Thus the poor results found in table
3 could be due to poor measures. In any event, the findings still suggest that
future researchers interested in testing the effects of slack might benefit from
using measures of change.)
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Slack Categories and Risk Taking
While the overall findings of this study are consistent with Singh (1982)
»
the findings for individual measures are not. Singh tested for associations
between risk taking and three measures of slack. He used one measure (QUICK)
from the "available" slack category and two measures (WKCAP and GENEXP) from the
"recoverable" slack category (Singh's labels for both the variables and
categories were different). Similar to the results of this study, Singh found
WKCAP and GENEXP to be associated with risk taking. QUICK, however, was not. He
consequently concluded that recoverable slack motivated increased risk taking but
available slack had no effect. He speculated that this may occur because liquid
resources that have not been absorbed by organizational activities are outside
the work flow of the organization and hence do not play the same buffering role
(against the consequences of risk taking) as do resources that have already been
absorbed into the workflow. In general his conclusion was that the ease-of-
recovery of the slack resources made a difference in the influence of slack on
risk taking.
The findings from this study do not support that conclusion. This study
investigated a wider range of measures, within all three categories (available,
recoverable, potential) of the Bourgeois and Singh framework. A glance at table
5 shows that measures all along the ease-of-recovery dimension were associated
with risk taking. Of particular interest are the results for the three measures
in the available category; each suggests a finding contrary to Singh.
Unallocated resources may influence behavior and slack need not necessarily be
absorbed into organizational activities to serve as a potential buffer and
motivate risk taking. One might also conclude that slack resources need not even
be under the organization's current control to exercise influence on behavior.
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This is suggested by the significant results for measures in the potential slack
category.
On The Dimensions Of Slack
Each of these conclusions concerning ease-of-recovery , however, rests on a
simple assumption: that the slack measures within each of the three categories
reflect separate and distinguishable aspects of the organization's condition.
While the arguments underlying the three category ease-of-recovery framework are
intuitively appealing the real issue is whether the measures from different
categories are related or distinct. That is an empirical question.
A look at the correlation matrix for the slack change measures (table 6)
indicates interrelationships among the variables. This is not entirely
unexpected since year-to-year changes in a firm would likely be captured by
various measures. Several correlations, however, are particularly high (above
.60) and merit some attention. Exploring these correlations may indicated
relationships between measures within or across categories and may lead to a
reduced set of measures that adequately capture the dimensions of slack.
INSERT IMF, ft
First, the pairwise correlation between CURRDEBT and TOTDEBT is .98, thus
changes in total liabilities are strongly driven by changes in current
liabilities. CURRDEBT and TOTDEBT are also each negatively correlated with QUICK
at about -.87. The common thread among these three measures is current lia-
bilities. Second, QUICK and ACCTREC are strongly negatively related (-.73).
(QUICK was consistently positively related to risk taking as hypothesized , while
ACCTREC was consistently negatively related, contrary to hypothesis. This is not
surprising given the strong negative correlation between the two slack change
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measures.) The negative correlation between QUICK and ACCTREC may be caused by a
temporary and, from the stand point of slack measurement, an unimportant
fluctuation in the collection of receivables. As explained earlier, QUICK and
ACCTREC along with INVENT were measures created by Bourgeois and Singh (1982) in
an attempt to decompose the broader measure WXCAP. The high inverse correlation
between QUICK and ACCTREC and the insignificance of INVENT suggest that
decomposition may be misleading.
If one accepts (a) that CURRDEBT, TOTDEBT and QUICK are all driven by
changes in current liabilities that are adequately captured by QUICK and (b)
that recombining QUICK, ACCTREC and INVENT into a single slack change measure is
appropriate, then WKCAP remains as a primary measure of interest. (WKCAP was
significantly associated with pricing strategy as predicted.) Changes in working
capital appear to represent one source of slack.
Next, note that PROFIT and INTCOV are highly related (.70). Again this is
perhaps not surprising; chang.es in profits should lead to corresponding changes
in the ability to service debt. (PROFIT and INTCOV were both significantly
related to risk taking.) Profits then may represent a second primary source of
slack
.
Next, note that GENEXP has relatively low correlations with all other
variables but was significantly related to pricing strategy. Resources tied up
in period expenses may represent a third source of slack.
Lastly, recall that only INVENT and NCASSET were significant in the slack
level tests presented in table 3. It has been argued above that INVENT should be
subsumed by WKCAP. NCASSET remains. NCASSET is not in general highly correlated
with the other measures. Resources tied up in plant and equipment may represent
a fourth source of slack.
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It is true that others looking at the correlation matrix may see other
"stories" that explain the interrelationships among the measures. The above is
offered as a plausible explanation. It is an attempt to summarize the various
individual slack measures into a reduced set of factors. While the three
category framework provided by Bourgeois and Singh was useful in initially
identifying potential sources of slack, the high interrelationships between some
individual measures indicate that the three categories, while conceptually
appealing, may not be empirically distinct.
Four sources of slack are tentatively suggested.
1
.
resources generated from increases in profits
2. resources tied up in excess working capital
3* resources absorbed as excess operating expenses
4. resources tied up in excess plant and equipment or productive
capacity
Measures related to profits, working capital, operating expenses and non-current
assets may adequately capture the dimensions of organizational slack that are
reflected in publicly available accounting data.
While future studies need not limit themselves to the measures used in this
paper, the four measures from this paper that appear important and distinct are
PROFIT, -WKCAP, GENEXP and NCASSET. Future research is perhaps necessary to
establish whether these four measures (or closely related ones) are consistently
distinct factors in other samples. However, studies of financial ratios (e.g,
Chen & Shimerda, 1981) indicate that these four measures align well with distinct
factors that have been shown to consistently exist in financial accounting data.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The broad conclusions of this study can be briefly summarized as follows.
(a) Increases in organizational slack appear to be followed by more risky
decisions.
(b) Measures of the change in slack over time rather than the amount of
slack at a point in time appear to be better indicators of risk taking
behavior.
(c) Slack is a multi-dimensional construct. Measurement along four
identified dimensions may be useful in reflecting the different aspects
of slack in empirical studies.
These conclusions must be tempered by two limitations. First only one
specific risk taking decision, product pricing strategy, was investigated. The
choice of pricing strategy for the sample firms investigated was not a trivial
one; the monetary value of the defense programs involved was large. Nonetheless,
only one type of strategic decision was examined; additional research is required
to explore the links between slack and other types of risky decisions.
Second, while financial accounting-based variables have been widely used in
past research to measure slack, such measures are only proxies for the idea of
"excess" resources implied by the slack concept. Conclusions should be
interpreted with this in mind. Validation of accounting-based measure against
alternative measures (perhaps developed via questionnaires or interviews of
organizational members) would be a useful direction for future research.
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FOOTNOTES
1. See Womer (1979) for a discussion of learning curve theory. See Greer
(1985) for an application of learning curves to pricing strategy.
2. For a discussion of the defense market see Olvey, Golden and Kelly (1984) or
Gansler (1980).
3. Readers familiar with defense contracting may question the ability of
manufacturers to exercise a pricing strategy. Prices are determined
primarily by competitive bids and negotiation and prices are typically
negotiated on a "cost plus" basis and determined by some agreed upon
formula. Prices may seem to be a direct function of costs incurred, with
little leeway allowed for contractor pricing discretion. However,
discretion enters through the determination of "cost".
In spite of regulation by the Cost Accounting Standards Board, substantial
flexibility exists within allowable cost accounting procedures. The
allowable procedures permit flexibility both in assigning costs to programs
within a given period and in assigning costs across different periods.
Accounting procedures that assign costs to different periods, in particular,
allow the recognition of costs earlier or later and consequently provide a
contractor with the flexibility to "cost justify" different pricing
strategies (Greer & Liao, 1983, 1984). Earlier recognition of costs would
be associated with a higher first unit price and steeper price reduction
curve. Delaying cost recognition would permit a lower first unit price but
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result in a flatter price reduction curve. Evidence (Greer, 1985)
substantiates a strong relationship between accounting methods used by
contractors and contractor pricing strategies. In short, while prices may
be tied to costs incurred in the defense contracting market, firms have an
ability to either skim or penetrate via the application of accounting
methods
.
4. For further discussion of factors that may influence pricing strategies, see
Caferelli (1980), Dean (1969), James (1969), and Wasson (1974).
5. Both Bourgeios (1981) and Singh (1983) provide reviews of the slack
literature and the varying definitions employed. Singh also reviews
approaches to the measurement of slack.
6. A logical approach to examine the interrelationships among the variables is
factor analysis. Factor analysis was conducted but not without problems.
As previously indicated, the slack change measures are undefined when
negative values are present, resulting in missing values. Different sample
firms had missing values for different slack change measures such that only
15 firms had slack change measures available for all variables. Separate
factor analyses were conducted on all the variables (for the 15 firms) and
on various subsets of the variables (in an attempt to increase sample size
above 15). Results were somewhat dependent on the variables included in the
particular factor analysis. There was, however, no evidence to contradict
the interpretation of interrelationships provided in the text.
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F-86D North American 51
F-86F North American 51
F-84F Republic 51
F-100A/C North American 52
F-1B/C/MF-1C North American 52
F-102-A General Dynamics 53
F 101-A/B/C McDonnell Douglas 54
F-100D North American 54
A-4B McDonnell Douglas 55
B-52G Boeing 57
F-106A/B General Dynamics 57
A-4C McDonnell Douglas 57
F-105B/D Republic 57
F-4A/B McDonnell Douglas 59
P-3A Lockheed 60
A-6A Gruman 61
RIM-24B General Dynamics 61
A-4E McDonnell Douglas 61
RIM-2E General Dynamics 61
F-4D McDonnell Douglas 64
A-7A/B Vought 65
P-3B Lockheed 65
RIM-66A General Dynamics 66




F-15A McDonnell Douglas 73
AGM-78D General Dynamics 73
AH-1S Bell 75
AH-1T Bell 76
F/A-18A McDonnell Douglas 79
AIM-7M Raytheon 80







































symbol CALCULATION with slack
AVAILABLE SLACK
PROFIT Net Income/Sales +
EQUITY (Stock. Equity t-Stock . Equity t _<, )/Sales +
QUICK (Cash + Mkt. Sec. - Curr. Liab.)/Sales +
RECOVERABLE SLACK:
WKCAP (Curr. Asset - Curr. Liab.)/Sales +
ACCTREC Accts. Rec . / Sales +
INVENT Inventory/Sales +
GENEXP (Sales - COGS - Net Income)/Sales +
NCASSET Non-Curr. Assets/Sales +
POTENTIAL SLACK:
CURRDEBT Curr. Liab. /Stock. Equity
LTDEBT Long Term Liab. /Stock. Equity
TOTDEBT Total Liab. /Stock. Equity
INTCOV (Net Income+Interest Exp.)/Interest Exp. +
TABLE 3





PROFIT 34 + -.13
EQUITY 31 + .14
QUICK 34 + -.10
RECOVERABLE SLACK:
WKCAP 34 .18
ACCTREC 34 + -.13
INVENT 34 + .29
GENEXP 33 + .13
NCASSET 34 + .30**
POTENTIAL SLACK:
CURRDEBT 34 - -.18
LTDEBT 34 - .07
TOTDEBT 34 - -.05
INTCOV 31 + -.11
* p < .10
** p < .05
One tailed tests.
TABLE 4
T Test for Difference in Price Reduction Slope:
















PROFIT .876 17 .849 17 + .98
EQUITY .873 20 .849 11 + .77
QUICK .882 18 .840 16 + 1 .56*
RECOVERABLE SLACK
WKCAP .893 15 .838 19 + 2.03**
ACCTREC .835 16 .887 18 + -1.96*
INVENT .853 21 .877 13 + -.72
GENEXP • .905 13 .837 20 + 2.48***
NCASSET .857 21 .872 13 + -.52
POTENTIAL SLACK
CURRDEBT .880 16 .847 18 + 1 .16
LTDEBT .855 18 .875 12 + -.66
TOTDEBT .881 15 .848 19 + 1.11
INTCOV .881 17 .847 14 + 1 .16
* p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01
*** Significant at < .01
One tailed tests.
TABLE 5




H SIGN (FULL) (PARTIAL)
iVAILABLE SI
PROFIT 27 + .27* .34**
EQUITY 19 + .37* .38*
QUICK 31 + .29* .33**
RECOVERABLE SLACK
WKCAP 31 + .38** .41**
ACCTREC 31 + -.27* -.31**
INVENT 31 + .10 .06
GENEXP 26 + .43** .43**
NCASSET 31 + -.04 -.01
'OTENTIAL SLACK
CURRDEBT 31 - -.42*** -.48***
LTDEBT 27 - -.01 -.09
TOTDEBT 31 - -.36** -.42***
INTCOV 24 + .26 .35**
* p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01
One tailed tests.
TAEL£6
Correlations Between Slack Change Measures
EQUTIY QUICK VKCAP ACCIHEC INVENT GENEXP OSSET CURRDEBT UDEBT 'lUlDtH' INICOV
PRCFTT .49 .17 .49 -22 .52 28 .11 -.20 -.12 -.24 .70
EQUITY .13 22 -.41 21 .12 .17 -.19 -.09 - -^8 .20
QUICK .19 -.73 -.41 .20 -.28 -.87 -.15 -.88 .07
VKCAP .12 .43 .45 .25 -.49 -.20 -.44 .25
Axirac 29 -.10 .59 .50 .10 .52 -.19
INVENT .11 .35 .31 .08 .31 .47
CENEXP -.07 -.25 -.15 -.20 2\
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